It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady's notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series of objections are considered and responded to.
Those who still find the assumption that we should defer to those who know what they are talking about implausible may note the following: the main upshot of the following sections is that we have good empirical reason to believe that there are certain things that sources may do for purposes of making it likely that people will defer to them. Consequently, so long as we can agree that there are some conditionswhatever they may be-under which we should defer, what follows will constitute a worthwhile contribution, since it tells us something about what we can do to promote deference where deference is deserved. In that respect, the above assumption about when we should defer is modular, as far as the purposes of the present paper are concerned. Consequently, in what follows, anyone finding the idea that someone knowing what they are talking about is a sufficient condition for us deferring to that someone altogether implausible should feel free to substitute their favored sufficient condition for any subsequent instance of the condition suggested above.
Having said something about what constitutes deference, we may now turn to the type of context of deference that will concern us in what follows. The relevant context involves educators providing intellectual advice about how to avoid bias, and it-in line with the assumption just discussed-being the case that students should defer on account of the educators knowing what they are talking about and thereby providing sound advice. Providing such advice involves providing a request together with a suggestion for how to go about one's epistemic business, a suggestion that's sound in so far as it's a good one. For example, in light of the statistician's law of large numbers, an educator might say: 'Listen, you shouldn't believe that the features of a small sample will tell you anything about the features of the population from which it's drawn.' When students heed the request and listen to the educator, they can be said to be complying with that request.
However, students complying with educators' requests to be listened to does not necessarily make for deference. This is because students might comply with such requests, but nevertheless fail to believe what they are being told. Given doxastic involuntarism, believing is not something that we do, so much as something that happens to us. For that reason, while we can be made to listen-more specifically, we can be made to attend (since an act) and trust that the automatic processing of content that should be doing, given our epistemic goal, whether or not it is always going to be transparent from a first-person point of view.
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Please quote from the published version, if possible. 8 follows upon attending thus will occur-we cannot be made to believe. Consequently, when thinking about the relationship between compliance and deference, we should focus on how to increase the chances that students will defer to (i.e., listen to and believe) educators providing sound intellectual advice. 16 Moreover, as for how to increase the chances thus, I will make two empirical assumptions: Under these two empirical assumptions, promoting deference to educators providing sound intellectual advice involves as an important component promoting compliance with requests on the part of said educators to be listened to. Having made that clear, we are now in a position to formulate the problem educators encounter when attempting to teach students how to avoid bias. The problem is not that there is no sound advice to be had. The problem is that, in a wide variety of cases where we should defer to others providing advice of the relevant kind, e.g., on account of them knowing what they are talking about and thereby providing sound intellectual advice, we fail to do so. As we shall see, one common reason that we fail to do so is that we tend to underestimate our tendencies for bias, and therefore fail to listen, let alone defer. We may refer to this as the problem of intellectual deference.
To grasp the nature and implications of this problem, we should understand it in the context of the well-established psychological fact that, depressed people aside, 19 most of us tend to rate ourselves as above average on desirable traits. 20 The extent to which we deem ourselves to be more objective and less biased than others is no exception on this score. For example, using a variety of measures of objectivity, David
Armor found that approximately 85 per cent of participants rated themselves as more objective than the average member of the group from which they were drawn. 21 Similarly, in a series of studies by Emily Pronin and colleagues, subjects rated themselves as less susceptible to each of a number of described biases compared both to the average American and to various peer groups. 22 As Pronin notes in a recent overview on 18 There does for present purposes not need to be a strong connection between one's normative beliefs and one's belief-formation. People who fail to believe what they are being told, or fail to have the relevant normative beliefs guide their belief-formation, will be no worse off epistemically than they would have been, had they not come across the relevant source of intellectual advice. Consequently, any relation between listening and having one's beliefs be regulated by the normative beliefs communicatedeven if not a strong one-will be for the better, epistemically speaking. That is, given such a relation, some will be epistemically better off, and no one will be epistemically worse off. When it comes to intellectual amelioration, we can do far worse than that.
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an obstacle to virtue. For that reason, the notion of procedural justice developed above can serve as a means to correcting exactly the kind of epistemic injustices that Coady is calling our attention to, by ridding those concerned of bias, paving the way for epistemic virtue, and thereby also reducing ignorance and correcting errors, including in cases of unjust ignorance and error.
To sum up, the notion of procedural justice defended here is distinct from but in no way in conflict with the notions of epistemic justice defended by Fricker and Coady. 51 In fact, the relevant notion of procedural justice can be utilized for purposes of mitigating cases of epistemic justice, at least as understood by Coady. However, that in itself does not go to show that the former notion will not prove problematic on some other ground. Let us consider some possible objections.
Objections
First, it might be objected that the legal cases at the heart of the research on the role of procedural justice and deference are simply too different from the cases that concern us in so far as we are worrying about the problem of intellectual deference. More specifically, return to one of the three problematic cases discussed at the end of Section 3, wherein a subject holds beliefs that run contrary to the recommendation provided by the source of intellectual advice, and thereby disagrees with the source. In light of this kind of case, someone might highlight the following disanalogy with the legal case: you can go along with a law you do not agree with (e.g., because you do not want to face sanctions, or because you consider the law-giver legitimate), but since belief-formation is not open to voluntary control, you cannot believe a recommendation you do not believe in, no matter how severe the sanctions or how legitimate you consider the source of the recommendation.
Clearly, there is such a disanalogy, but does it present a problem for the present suggestion that we may solve the problem of intellectual deference with reference to a notion of procedural justice? It does not. The reason is that the relevant analogy is not between believing and following the law, but between listening and following the law.
Moreover, here is something we can certainly do: we can listen to a source of intellec-51 Coady (2010) suggests that there is a tension between his notion of distributive epistemic justice and
Fricker's notion of testimonial justice. I remain neutral on the questions whether there is such a tension for present purposes; all that matters for our investigation is that there is no tension between the notion of procedural justice defended here and the notions defended by Fricker and Coady, respectively. ance with what is taken for granted by any practice involving attempts to bring people to believe things-even in cases where the people involved believe the opposite-we are merely trying to increase the chances of belief or belief-change, and assume that bringing people to listen stands a good chance of doing exactly that.
Let us consider a second objection. The claims made here about procedural justice are both empirical and conceptual in nature. The empirical claim is that sources satisfying the input, factuality, consideration, and effort conditions increase the chances that people will consult as well as listen to them. The conceptual claim is that those conditions capture a notion of procedural justice. Someone might object that the preceding sections do not give us sufficient reason to talk of the conditions identified as capturing a form of procedural justice. To such a person it might be worth it to point out that what ultimately matters for purposes of this paper is that there are certain conditions that, if satisfied, help us solve the problem of intellectual deference, in accordance with the above empirical claim. I find it helpful to refer to the joint satisfaction of those conditions as procedural justice, particularly given their roots in Tyler's research as well as their place in the larger matrix of epistemically relevant notions of justice discussed in the previous section. That said, I am not particularly interested in conceptual legislation.
A third objection is this: it has been suggested that providers of sound intellectual advice should listen without epistemic discrimination, including to those who might be gravely mistaken and as such have nothing to say, in order to bring about consultation and compliance. Moreover, an empirical assumption was made about the relation between compliance and deference, to the effect that listening to someone is conducive to believing what one is being told. But given that assumption, there is a danger that those made to listen without discrimination, for purposes of practicing the relevant kind of procedural justice, might actually start believing what they are being told by people who are gravely mistaken-or so the objection goes.
In response, it should be noted that, if there's anything that's likely to block the route from listening to deference it's the ability of the informed to see that those who are gravely mistaken are just that. Indeed, were it not the case that the informed typically are able to do so, education would generally be a failure. However, education is not generally a failure, and to the extent that there are challenges associated with the epistemic asymmetry characterizing educator-student relationships, it seems safe to assume that those challenges rarely if ever stem from an inability of educators to listen to the gravely mistaken without becoming convinced that they are, in fact, informed. In other words, while it is not strictly speaking impossible that the informed are in some cases misled by those gravely mistaken, it seems safe to assume that it is likely that the informed will tend not to defer, on account of being able to tell that the gravely mistaken are indeed just that.
A fourth objection to what has been argued in the above is that there is something questionable, maybe even objectionable, about practicing the relevant kind of procedural justice. Often, we listen to people because we are interested in hearing what they are saying, and not primarily for the purpose of having them listen to us in turn.
If educators or other people in the business of providing sound intellectual advice listen to us primarily for purposes of having us listen to them, is there a sense in which they are using us? I am inclined to say 'no', the reason being this: while it would make sense to talk about people using us if the purpose of getting us to listen would be for them to gain something (think advertisement), the contexts that concern us here involve attempts to get us to listen for the purpose of benefitting us. If we can be brought to listen to sources providing sound intellectual advice, we are not being used-on the contrary, we are being helped. Specifically, we are being helped to become better thinkers.
Conclusion
Educators have reason to instill epistemic virtues in students, on account of how epistemic virtues constitute dispositions conducive to epistemic goals, such as knowledge, which also happens to be the fundamental goal of education. Moreover, since cognitive bias constitutes a common obstacle to such virtue, educators also have reason to teach students how to avoid bias. The problem is that it is a well-established fact that we often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing bias on account of us being overconfident about our intellectual abilities, and thereby underestimating our Forthcoming in Episteme. Please quote from the published version, if possible. 26 susceptibility to bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators delivering their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justices were specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady's notions of testimonial justice. Finally, a series of objections were considered and responded to. 52, 53 
